The Boeing 737 MAX has a very familiar silhouette, but to keen observers, something looks slightly different: the nose seems a little higher, the stance a touch taller, and the instantly recognizable LEAP-1B engines appear to sit closer to the ground than on other new-generation narrowbodies. That raises an obvious question: why does the 737 MAX sit higher than the Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG) in the first place, and why didn’t Boeing just give it much taller landing gear and be done with it?

The answer lies in a web of design compromises stretching back to the original 1960s 737. The MAX had to accommodate far larger, more efficient engines on a low-slung airframe, while staying close enough to the NG to retain the same type rating and keep costs down for airlines. This guide looks at where the extra height actually comes from, why Boeing couldn’t simply stretch the MAX, and what that means for ground clearance, handling, and the future of the Boeing 737 family.

Why So Low?

When the first 737s entered service in the late 1960s, their flight profile looked very different from that of today’s MAX. Boeing designed the original -100 and -200 to operate from smaller airports with limited infrastructure, where belt loaders, jet bridges, and tall service vehicles weren’t guaranteed. A low-slung fuselage meant ground crews could load bags by hand, caterers could work with basic trolleys, and passengers could board via simple stairs rather than fixed airbridges. The engines of those early 737s also made the low stance easy.

The Pratt & Whitney JT8D turbojets had relatively small fan diameters and sat close to the wing, so there was no need for tall landing gear or large pylons to clear the ground. The layout worked perfectly for the era. It was low-cost, made ground handling simple, and had a compact footprint on smaller ramps. As the 737 evolved into the Classic and NG families, the basic geometry stayed.

The CFM56 turbofan that powered the 737-300/400/500 and later the 737NG series was far larger in diameter, so Boeing flattened the bottom of the nacelle, the famous “hamster pouch”, and shifted the engines slightly forward and up on redesigned pylons. The NG also gained a new supercritical wing and structural changes, but the overall philosophy remained the same: keep the aircraft low enough for easy ground operations, while squeezing in ever larger and more efficient engines.

Learning From Old Ideas

By the time the 737 MAX was launched, the next step in engine technology, with the CFM LEAP-1B, presented Boeing with a much more serious packaging challenge. Compared to the CFM56-7B on the NG, the LEAP-1B has a fan diameter of roughly 69.4 inches versus about 61 inches on the older engine, plus a bulkier nacelle and modern noise-reduction features, as per B737.org. With such an increase in overall engine size, trade-offs elsewhere became necessary to help fit such an engine to the new variant.

On an all-new fuselage sitting higher off the ground, like the Airbus A320neo, that larger fan isn’t a big problem. On the 737, which already had limited ground clearance, it absolutely is. The LEAP-1B needed enough space under the nacelle to safely clear the runway during rotation, crosswind landings, and bounce scenarios, while still keeping the 737’s distinctive low stance and compatibility with existing airports. To buy that extra clearance, Boeing made several key changes.

The MAX’s nose strut is around 20 cm (about 8 in) longer than the NG’s, lifting the entire front of the aircraft and giving the MAX its slightly “nose-high” ground attitude. Just as on the NG, the MAX’s engines sit further forward and higher relative to the wing compared to older 737s, improving both clearance and airflow. In addition, the LEAP nacelle retains a flattened underside to help maintain clearance while still accommodating a larger fan.

Clearance figures vary by source and configuration, but all agree that it is relatively low compared to newer ‘clean-sheet’ designs.

These changes collectively explain why the MAX looks a bit taller at the front than the NG. But they also raise another question: if you’re already extending the nose gear and moving the engines, why not go further and lengthen all the landing gear to truly “fix” the ground clearance? As is usually the case in aircraft manufacturing, there is always a good reason for choosing such designs.

Why Not Just Change Everything?

A frequent misconception is that Boeing could have easily solved ground-clearance issues by designing longer landing gear, making the MAX resemble the much taller Airbus A320neo. It seems like a simple solution to fix such an issue. However, in reality, the 737’s internal geometry makes this nearly impossible without rebuilding the aircraft. According to multiple engineers on Quora, the main landing gear on the 737 retracts inward into a wheel well with only a few inches of remaining clearance.

On the NG and MAX, the left and right main wheels nearly touch when retracted. Lengthening these struts even a few inches would prevent the gear from fitting, forcing Boeing to redesign the wing box and fuselage structure. Such a change would be far too complex and costly for the manufacturer, resulting in the design that we see today.

This is why only the Boeing 737 MAX 10 received a redesigned main gear, which uses a two-stage, semi-levered telescoping mechanism that extends during takeoff roll but folds compactly enough to fit within the unchanged wheel well. Even with this new addition, it only extended the main gear length by 9.5 inches, the absolute maximum achievable without altering the core structure. This helps to put into perspective just how difficult it is to gain extra height from the landing gear, even when using advanced technologies. The core design of the 737 simply cannot accommodate a drastic change like this without a complete redesign.

An Unwanted Knock-On Effect

Given the constraints around landing gear design, Boeing explored alternative methods to achieve the necessary clearance for the LEAP-1B engines. As is the case for the entire project as a whole, a substantial amount of research and development went into bringing the 737 family into the next generation. Moving the engines forward and upward became the most viable compromise. This repositioning helped provide the clearance required while avoiding major structural redevelopment.

The downside, however, was aerodynamic: the new placement altered the pitch-up tendency during high angles of attack, requiring Boeing to introduce MCAS to mimic NG handling characteristics and preserve a common type rating. Unfortunately, as a result, tragic accidents occurred due to the MCAS activating inappropriately at critical stages of flight. This came from a combination of the new flight system’s reliance on just a single angle of attack (AoA) sensor, and many pilots were not fully briefed on the system’s behavior or failure modes.

This decision, driven by competitive pressure from Airbus’s A320neo, allowed Boeing to deliver the MAX quickly while avoiding an all-new aircraft program. However, it also meant preserving decades-old design constraints, which ultimately shaped the aircraft’s engineering compromises.

Could The Solution Be Elsewhere?

Many observers notice that the MAX’s most visible difference is the taller nose, leading to questions about why the main gear wasn’t modified in the same way. Ultimately, the main reason for this is the differences in available space and general construction between the nose and main gear sections.

The nose-gear bay on the 737 has more vertical room than the main gear compartment, making limited extension feasible. The MAX nose strut was lengthened by about 8 inches (20.3 cm), providing a small but essential boost in clearance. The main landing gear, by contrast, has no extra room and cannot lengthen without major structural redesign, as confirmed by engineers and construction analyses.

This subtle change contributes to the MAX’s slightly nose-high stance on the ground, improving rotation angle and engine clearance without compromising compatibility with existing 737 infrastructure. In all, it allows the MAX to be the most improved and advanced version of Boeing’s famous 737 line to date and to compete with other advanced narrowbody aircraft from competitors around the world.

Inherent Blockade

The MAX’s altered ground height influences multiple operational areas, from engine maintenance access to rotation performance and turn-around procedures. Its height remains lower than most modern jets, but slightly higher than the NG variant.

Pilots transitioning from the NG often note the modified rotation feel and slightly different sight picture. Airlines benefit from the fact that all 737 variants still work with existing steps, loaders, and maintenance tooling, a major factor in Boeing’s decision to avoid a clean-sheet redesign.

Looking ahead, only the MAX-10 pushes the landing gear design close to its physical limits with a telescoping mechanism. Boeing’s long-term successor to the 737 will almost certainly abandon the low-slung design entirely, freeing future aircraft from the constraints that shaped the MAX.